The decline of public concern on climate change in the US

Opinion polls indicate that public opinion in the US (but perhaps more widely) has cooled with regard to climate change in the past few years. What are the reasons? Commentators here on Klimazwiebel and elsewhere sometimes blame the efforts by climate sceptics to influence or 'mislead' the public. They thus are easily blamed for the lack of progress in climate policy and cast as enemies who need to be defeated. In addition, the email scandal in 2009, known as climategate, is sometimes invoked in addition. Several climate scientists and their supporters hold dear to this view. So how will they react to empirical studies which reveal their belief as a myth?

GLOBAL WARMING IS PRIMARILY CAUSED BY...
Date	Human activity	Planetary Trends	Other Reason
Jan 2012	40%	39%	8%
Sep 2011	36%	44%	6%
Jun 2011	40%	42%	7%
Apr 2011	36%	47%	7%
Jan 2011	40%	44%	7%
Dec 2010	41%	47%	5%
Nov 2010	38%	45%	7%
Oct 2010	39%	42%	7%
Aug 2010	40%	45%	7%
Jul 2010	34%	45%	8%
May 2010	40%	44%	5%
Apr 2010	33%	48%	11%
Mar 2010	33%	48%	8%
Feb 2010	35%	47%	8%
Jan 2010	37%	50%	5%
Dec 09	34%	50%	6%
Nov 09	37%	47%	5%
Oct 09	38%	46%	3%
Sep 09	42%	47%	5%
Jul 09	39%	47%	6%
Jun 09	42%	40%	10%
May 09	39%	44%	7%
Apr 09	34%	48%	7%
Mar 09	41%	43%	7%
Feb 09	38%	45%	7%
Jan 09	44%	41%	7%
Dec 08	43%	43%	6%
Apr 08	47%	34%	8%

(source: Rasmussen Report)



There are two recent studies which should be read in this regard. The first is by Lyle Scruggs and Salil Benegal, to be published in Global Environmental Change. Here is the abstract:

Social surveys suggest that the American public’s concern about climate change has declined dramatically since 2008. This has led to a search for explanations for this decline, and great deal of speculation that there has been a fundamental shift in public trust in climate science. We evaluate over thirty years of public opinion data about global warming and the environment, and suggest that the decline in belief about climate change is most likely driven by the economic insecurity caused by the Great Recession. Evidence from European nations further supports an economic explanation for changing public opinion. The pattern is consistent with more than forty years of public opinion about environmental policy. Popular alternative explanations for declining support – partisan politicization, biased media coverage, fluctuations in short-term weather conditions – are unable to explain the suddenness and timing of opinion trends. The implication of these findings is that the ‘‘crisis of confidence’’ in climate change will likely rebound after labor market conditions improve, but not until then.

The second is by Robert J. Brulle, Jason Carmichael and J. Craig Jenkins, published in Climatic Change (paywalled but summarized here). The following quote from the conclusion (not on the previous link, but taken from the paper) summarizes their findings:

The major factors that affect levels of public concern about climate change can be
grouped into three areas. First, media coverage of climate change directly affects the level of public concern. The greater the quantity of media coverage of climate change, the greater the level of public concern. This is in line with the Quantity of Coverage theory of media effects, and existing individual level research on the impact of television coverage on climate-change concern. The importance the media assigns to coverage of climate change translates into the importance the public attaches to this issue. Second, in a society with a limited amount of “issue space,” unemployment, economic prosperity, and involvement in wars all compete with climate change for public concern. The most important factor in influencing public opinion on climate change, however, is
the elite partisan battle over the issue. The two strongest effects on public concern are Democratic Congressional action statements and Republican roll-call votes, which increase and diminish public concern, respectively. This finding points to the effect of polarized political elite that is emitting contrary cues, with resulting (seemingly) contrary levels of public concern. As noted by McDonald (2009: 52) “When elites have consensus, the public follows suit and the issue becomes mainstreamed. When elites disagree, polarization occurs, and citizens rely on other indicators, such as political party or source credibility, to make up their minds.” This appears to be the case with climate change. The implication would seem to be that a mass communications effort to alter the salience
of the climate change issue is unlikely to have much impact. A great deal of focus has been devoted to the analysis and development of various communication techniques to better convey an understanding of climate change to individual members of the public. However, this analysis shows that these efforts have a minor influence, and are dwarfed by the effect of the divide on environmental issues in the political elite. Additionally, the analysis has shown that, in line with the media effects literature, the effects of communication on public opinion regarding climate change are short lived. A high level of public concern over climate change was seen only during a period of both high levels of media coverage and active statements about the issue’s seriousness from political elites. It rapidly declined when these two factors declined. Thus, if public concern is to be sustained under the present circumstances, there is a need for continuous public communications efforts to maintain public support for climate change action in the face of opposing messaging campaigns.

While these studies are somewhat inconclusive as regards the effect of weather, they agree in one important aspect: it is not the sceptical propaganda which influences public perception of climate change. The first study examines the effect of the economic crisis, while the second emphasizes the susceptibility of Republicans for climate sceptical arguments. Activist climate scientists should take heed and think again. Which war do they think they are fighting?